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Beginning in 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to define
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(DoD). This article illustrates several components important for CBP implementation to
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and the defense community.
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In 2003, President Bush’s Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) required 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary to develop a national domestic 
all-hazards preparedness goal.  The intent was to establish measurable readiness priorities 
and balance threats and consequences with resources required to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from them.  The goal would include readiness measures, standards for 
preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system to assess the nation’s overall 
preparedness to respond to major events, especially terrorist acts. 
Paying attention to the goal and related readiness priorities, particularly at the state 
and local levels, is vital, for at least one simple reason—federal funding.  Under the 
directive, state all-hazard preparedness strategies consistent with the national 
preparedness goal will determine federal preparedness assistance.1  This direction was 
affirmed when Congress subsequently cited HSPD-8 for preparedness requirements and 
funding in the fiscal year 2005 DHS appropriations’ language.  The National Intelligence 
Reform Act of 2004 also required DHS to set national performance standards and ensure 
state homeland security plans’ conformance with those standards. 
Responding to the HSPD-8 mandates, DHS adopted a capabilities-based planning 
approach (CBP) from the United States Department of Defense (DoD).  This article 
describes the approach, implementation practices from the DoD experience, and contrasts 
with the DHS strategies. 
 
CBP MODEL FOR HSPD 8 IMPLEMENTATION 
Capabilities-based planning is one approach that is intended to manage risk, set specific 
preparedness goals and priorities, make investment choices, and evaluate preparedness 
results.  Proponents describe CPB as developing the means—capabilities—to respond to 
a wide range of potential challenges and circumstances while mindful of costs and 
sustainability.  CBP uses intelligence, strategic studies, and experiences to describe 
potential future threats and specific event or longer-term scenarios.  The scenarios are 
used to define specific capabilities through an analytical framework starting with mission 
objectives and measures of strategic and operational success and ending with an 
assessment of options on factors such as risk.  Choices consider capability tradeoffs and 
impacts at multiple levels within and across organizational components.2 
All member nations of the defense community’s Technical Cooperation Program 
(TCP)—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States—use 
capability concepts for long-term future defense force structure planning.  The central 
audience for the defense community’s CBP is the “combatant commander” who must 
achieve specific missions.  The TCP’s generic CBP process chart, shown in Figure 1, 
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starts with overarching guidance, identifies capability gaps, explores options, and ends 















































DEFENSE CBP COMPONENTS AND DHS IMPLEMENTATION 
My review of the defense community’s CBP experience represented by the TCP 
highlights several components important for CBP implementation to contrast with DHS’s 
approach and provide “lessons learned” useful for future CBP implementation.4  In the 
following sections, I describe these components and briefly contrast them with DHS’s 
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Table 1. DHS Approach and the Defense Components 
Components DHS Progress 
Business Case for CBP Adoption:  Justify 
organizational commitment and investment 
Business case stated in terms of national 
preparedness in HSPD-8 and now in legislation; clear 
business case still to be made for adopting CBP. 
Strategic, Cascading Policy Goals:  Use 
top-level government guidance that cascades 
goals into strategic policy and operational 
documents and into CBP. 
Multiple sources of policy goals including national 
strategies, HSPD-8 and other presidential directives, the 
National Response Plan, and the National Incident 
Management System; integrated, single-source policy 
document for homeland security and national 
preparedness not yet available. 
Stakeholder Ownership:  Ensure 
stakeholder involvement, collaboration, and 
perspective-sharing. 
Inconsistent attention paid to state and local entities 
as primary stakeholders; primarily federal approach used 
in consultation with, not collaboration with those 
entities.  Private sector stakeholders yet to be closely 
involved. 
Top Leader Ownership:  Ensure top leader 
support, involvement, and decision-making. 
Federal leadership within DHS appears supportive; 
top leadership from other stakeholders still evolving.  
Decision-making processes not transparent and 
apparently fragmented. 
Specific Management Decision-Making 
Process:  Design and implement CBP decision 
process that captures mission tasks and 
capabilities, their priority, how they relate, 
solutions, and resource allocation. 
Process has evolved over time but is not formally 
structured with clear responsibilities, decision-making 
roles, and integration into stakeholders strategic 
planning, budgeting, program evaluation, and corrective 
action.  Interim documents extend the process. 
Risk Assessment Approach:  Use risk 
assessment in the CBP management process to 
determine investments. 
Risk assessment is not well-defined and presented 
as an integral part of DHS CBP decision-making similar 
to the defense communities. 
Different Planning Horizons:  Incorporate 
different planning horizons into CBP to stage 
the development of capabilities. 
No expression of planning horizons to date; DHS 
has promised to evolve CBP and planning horizons may 
be part of the evolvement. 
Mission-Based, Phased Scenarios: Have 
the right scenarios on which to base planning 
and/or exercises 
Selection of 15 scenarios for planning; concern the 
scenarios are much too focused on terrorism in contrast 
to a clearer all-hazards approach and do not include 
different timeframes, including very long term. 
Capability Development and Standard 
Categories:  Provide guidelines to craft 
capabilities and develop standard capability 
categories that fully reflect what effects the 
capabilities should generate. 
Limited guidance on how to develop capabilities; 
capability categories still in process; no clear direction 
provided as to what is the best way to structure the 
capabilities for use by most entities. 
Decision Rules for Lists:  Establish clear 
rules for the development of task lists and 
capability lists. 
Rules for development not explicit; changing 
categories and elements. 
CBP Evolution:  Evolve CBP depending on 
planning applications and developing maturity. 
Policy timeframes have precluded a more 
evolutionary approach to CBP and addressing differing 
maturity in capability areas. 
CBP Enablers:  Consider organizational 
and cultural enablers to support CBP adoption. 
Enablers may be recognized but have not been 
adequately addressed; process characterized by rapid 
spiral development with extremely limited timeframes 
for consideration. 
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Business Case for CBP Adoption 
First, CBP adoption requires a strong business case to justify the organizational 
commitment and investment.  In the defense communities, the business case grew 
primarily out of the need to shift defense planning from a “threat-based” model to a 
“capabilities-based” model. Instead of planning for large conventional wars in a few 
distant theaters under the threat-based model, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
proposed identifying capabilities that relied on surprise, deception, and asymmetric 
warfare to deter and defeat adversaries. 
DoD used threat-based planning since DoD instituted the Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting System in 1962.  However, threat-based planning meant strong response 
to a few situations while largely ignoring all other potential challenges.  DoD’s threat-
based approach and illustrative official planning scenarios for major theater wars served 
as specifications, defining necessary and sufficient characteristics of the force structure, 
thereby leading to consistent support of current programs.  The approach only considered 
conventional-wisdom threats and point-in-time versions of detailed scenarios, as though 
the circumstances of future conflict could be predicted.  In the foreword to the Joint 
Operations Concepts, Secretary Rumsfeld said a capabilities-based approach would focus 
more on how the United States would defeat an adversary’s broad array of capabilities 
instead of identifying who the adversaries were and where they might threaten joint 
forces or United States’ interest. 
While addressing the limitations of threat-based planning was the primary business 
case for DoD’s adoption of CBP, there were other reasons too.  CBP attempts to break 
down traditional single-service stovepipes allowing systems and concepts from multiple 
services to achieve capabilities.  A joint focus encourages decisions with broad defense 
force goals in mind instead of considering their own service.  CBP also compares options 
for achieving the same capability in an integrated fashion.  Before CBP, acquisition 
requirements often were developed, validated, and approved as stand-alone solutions to 
counter specific threats or scenarios with systems integration forced at the end.  The 
result was duplication, poor spiral acquisition practices, and problems in prioritizing joint 
warfighting needs.  CBP links procurement decisions to strategic goals and provides an 
audit trail for accountability. 
Thus, the defense community experience suggests the adoption of CBP requires a 
strong business case to justify the organizational commitment and investment, such as 
flexibility in addressing current and future adversaries and their strategies.  For homeland 
security, DHS officials assumed there would be overwhelming state and local support of 
a national preparedness goal simply because it was mandated in HSPD-8.  Beyond this 
almost “motherhood and apple pie” argument, very little attention was paid to significant 
benefits that might result, such as clearly defined levels of preparedness understandable 
across many organizations and useful for funding decisions.  In addition, a clear business 
case was not made in support of an all-hazards approach under the national goal.  The 
goal’s implementation clearly stressed counter-terrorism, with all-hazards a secondary 
emphasis. 
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Strategic, Cascading Policy Goals 
A second component is establishing specific strategic policy goals from top-level 
government guidance to derive high-level capability objectives.  These policy goals 
support the use of top-level doctrine or some overarching operational concepts that 
consider the way a force will fight.  Moreover, these goals cascade into strategic policy 
and operational documents, and then into the CBP process and its planning outputs.  For 
example, the foundation for Canada’s CBP was an early White Paper that defined 
governmental expectations, leading to a Strategy 2020 document that articulated the 
national defense vision.  In turn, the Canadian Forces concept of force employment was 
crafted to describe how the national defense vision would be delivered.  Force planning 
scenarios illustrated where and when the concept of employment would be applied, 
finally leading to Canada’s capability goals matrix and Canada Joint Task List (CJTL) for 
CBP.  In the United Kingdom, a defense white paper also set out the need to defend 
against future principal security challenges such as international terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and weak and failing states.  The Australia 
Department of Defence also relied on a white paper on the future of Australia’s defense 
force. 
A similar process occurred in DoD in planning for joint processes and in individual 
services.  DoD built its strategic framework to defend the nation and secure a viable 
peace around four defense policy goals—assuring allies and friends, dissuading future 
military competition, deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests, and if 
deterrence failed, decisively defeating any adversary.  These strategic policy goals are 
further defined in other documents.  For example, within DoD joint force decision- 
making concepts – Joint Operations Concepts, Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional 
Concepts, and Joint Integrating Concepts – are translated into a capability level of detail, 
often using a time frame of 10 to 20 years into the future.  Military judgment is applied to 
those concepts to validate what collection of attributes and measures are needed, and thus 
a standard for critical functional areas.  Current programs are mapped against that 
standard to compare current capabilities against the standard, propose alternatives, choose 
a specific capability, and then move that decision into the investment strategy. 
In summary, specific policy goals, derived from top-level government guidance, 
should cascade into strategic policy and operational documents, and then into the CBP 
process and its planning outputs.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security provided 
the most central statement of homeland security intent, but was written largely in support 
of the formation of DHS.  It was joined by other sources of national policy goals, 
including other national homeland security-related strategies, HSPD-8 and other 
presidential directives, federal agency strategic plans, regulations and policy guidance, 
the National Response Plan, and the National Incident Management System.  In large 
part, these various documents are statements of federal perspectives because no clear 
mechanism exists to produce top-level “national” guidance that is accepted and 
applicable across all levels of government, non-governmental organizations, and the 
private sector.  Unlike what appears to be the case in the defense communities, these 
various federally-developed national policy documents stand alone.  They have not been 
systematically integrated into a cohesive policy whole.  That may be the role envisioned 
for the national preparedness goal and related guidance, but its current construction will 
not meet that need.  In some cases, there are conflicting objectives and requirements 
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across the policy documents.  DHS could solve this problem with a single-source policy 
document for homeland security and national preparedness. 
Stakeholder Ownership 
A third component is ensuring stakeholder ownership, especially important for joint 
planning and operations.  The TCP says that one of the first requirements for successful 
implementation of CBP is stakeholder involvement, described in collaborative terms.  
Stakeholders generally control the information, resources, and authority required to 
support CBP, and their requirements must be considered from the outset.  Key 
stakeholders—those responsible for identifying and deploying the capability envelopes—
will eventually control the CBP process, and it is important that they have ownership of 
it.  Each stakeholder should have an understanding of the perspectives of other 
stakeholders and an appreciation of different, if not competing, requirements.  Defense 
planners should be engaged at all levels.  As with other components, the decision-making 
process can help build in stakeholder ownership.  For example, the U.S. Air Force 
(USAF) uses its decision process to secure “joint acceptance” of capability selections. 
To summarize, the defense community experience shows that the stakeholders should 
own the process and take responsibility for its use and outputs.  Stakeholders generally 
control the information, resources, and authority required to support CBP.  For homeland 
security, DHS attempted to include stakeholders such as state and local government 
officials, national associations, and other federal agencies involved in homeland security.  
However, instead of taking a partnering, collaborative approach, DHS used consultants to 
develop voluminous draft material and then asked for stakeholder reaction.  DHS 
justified consultation rather than partnership on the tight national goal implementation 
timeframes in HSPD-8 and its requirement for federal development in consultation with 
others.  The end result has been “push back” from key state and local stakeholders, 
confusion about intent and requirements, and lack of understanding of CBP and what it is 
intended to do.  In hindsight, of course, a better approach would have been to partner and 
take a less complex approach to implementation if the HSPD-8 implementation 
timeframes could not be changed. 
Top Leader Ownership 
Another component is top leader support, involvement, and decision-making—
ownership—for the CBP process.  DoD’s Joint Integrating Concepts (Joint Concepts) are 
delivered with a detailed scenario, concept of operations (CONOPS), and a list of tasks 
with measures for a Functional Capabilities Board (Board) to perform a capabilities based 
assessment on each Joint Concept and perform a data call to services to match Joint 
Concept tasks to current, programmed, and planned systems.  Each Board is a key 
decision-making body. 
Only the high-level Joint Requirements Operation Council can charter a Board.  The 
Boards ensure new capabilities are conceived and developed in a joint warfighting 
context and proposals are consistent with an integrated joint force.  They also organize, 
analyze, and prioritize capabilities proposals, oversee the development and updating of 
functional concepts, and ensure integrated architectures reflect the functional areas.  Each 
Board assesses the Joint Concept against the baseline scenario provided by the author, 
and then may run it against additional Defense planning scenarios to refine the conditions 
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and standards for each task and aggregate capability.  The CBP output is a weighted list 
of capability needs, gaps, and excesses. 
In 2000, the USAF began developing six CONOPs to support its contribution to the 
joint defense strategy.  All USAF operations, programming, and budget decisions in turn 
are designed to support the capabilities defined by the CONOPs.  Six new CONOPS 
divisions on the USAF Air Staff in the Operations Requirements Directorate were created 
to connect CBP around these CONOPS.  Each of the USAF’s six CONOPS has an 
assigned advocate called a Champion responsible for the capabilities the USAF has, or 
needs to develop.  The CONOPS Champions play a key role in mitigating risk throughout 
CONOPS development.  They are charged with overseeing the entire development 
process and for communicating issues to senior leadership.  CONOPS assessment and 
analysis is conducted by subject matter experts under the critical jurisdiction of each 
Champion.  CONOPS Champions will integrate priorities among capabilities for review 
by the USAF corporate structure and participate in the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council via USAF challenges.  Oversight action and challenges ensure all CONOPS 
capabilities are addressed at the Boards to help ensure all programs are jointly accepted. 
Therefore, the defense community experience demonstrates that top leadership 
support, involvement, and decision-making are critical to CBP success.  For defense, 
support has truly started at the top of cabinet departments and ministries and been 
sustained.  Top military and civilian officials are responsible for CBP and are held 
accountable for its operation.  In contrast, DHS never established similar top leadership 
authorities and decision-making processes for CBP.  This could be corrected by 
establishing a formal board, similar to the DoD Functional Capabilities Board for top 
CBP leadership.  Such a board would include federal, state, and local representation with 
national state and local associations tasked to name representatives. 
Specific Management Decision-Making Process 
A fifth component is a well-designed and implemented decision process for CBP.  This 
process should capture tasks and capabilities needed to carry out missions and their 
priority, how they relate, solutions to meet those needs, and allocation of resources.  For 
example, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), the 
Defense Acquisition System, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
process form DoD’s three principle decision support processes to transform the military 
forces to support the National Military Strategy and the Defense Strategy.  The JCIDS 
provides an enhanced methodology to identify and describe gaps and redundancies in 
capabilities, prioritize capability proposals, and improve collaboration with other 
departments and agencies.  The goal is to ensure that the joint force has the capabilities 
necessary to perform across the range of military operations. 
JCIDS analysis begins with a Functional Area Analysis that identifies the operational 
tasks, conditions, and standards needed to achieve military objectives.  As input, it uses 
the national strategies, Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, Joint 
Integrating Concepts, Integrated Architectures, the Universal Joint Task List, and the 
anticipated range of broad capabilities that adversaries might employ.  Output consists of 
the tasks to be reviewed in the follow-on Functional Needs Analysis that assesses the 
ability of the current and programmed joint capabilities to accomplish the tasks that the 
functional area analysis identified, under the full range of operating conditions and in 
7Caudle: Capabilities-based Planning
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
compliance with designated standards.  The needs analysis produces a list of capability 
gaps or shortcomings that require solutions and indicates the time frame in which those 
solutions are needed.  A Functional Solution Analysis follows, which is an operationally-
based assessment of potential approaches to solving (or mitigating) one or more of the 
capability gaps (needs) identified in the Functional Needs Analysis. 
A capabilities review and risk assessment (CRRA) step following a functional needs 
analysis is the most important step for the Air Force.  In the CRRA, capability measures 
are developed from a variety of analysis tools such as current intelligence estimates, 
modeling and simulation, and wargaming.  Measures of effectiveness are assigned to all 
levels of required capabilities within a master capabilities list to score how well the 
USAF performs.  Scenarios are selected to assess the USAF’s ability to deliver effects 
needed.  Scenarios from the Defense planning scenarios are used and further refined by 
guidelines in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.  The 
scenarios also are modified by more demanding requirements known as stressors to craft 
broad spectrum capabilities.  Analysis determines a definition of problems and capability 
shortfalls, presented to USAF senior leadership for decision-making and resource 
allocation. 
Thus, the defense community experience indicates a well-designed and implemented 
decision process for CBP is an element for success.  This process should capture tasks 
and capabilities needed to carry out missions and their priority, how they relate, and 
solutions for meeting those needs.  Homeland security, however, does not yet have a 
process similar, for example, to DoD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System.  The homeland security CBP process at this point is not formally structured with 
clear responsibilities, decision-making roles, defined steps and expected inputs and 
outputs, and melding into formal organizational planning, budgeting, and procurement 
decisions.  It is not clear how CBP will be seamlessly integrated with existing 
management approaches for government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
private sector companies.  The linkage from results expectations to budgeting is 
particularly problematic for funders such as boards of directors, city councils, state 
legislatures, and Congress must accept and act on CBP’s analytical framework and its 
products for decision-making. 
Risk Assessment Approach 
A sixth component is using risk assessment in the CBP management process.  A key tenet 
of CBP is addressing affordability and sustainability, which means that not all 
capabilities can be deployed or maintained.  Affordability and sustainability requires 
addressing risk tolerances and priorities for capability development and deployment, and 
assessing capabilities and their impacts over time.  Balancing investments in CBP will 
require deletions and additions in elements such as force development as part of risk and 
priority setting. 
For example, the DoD developed a broad approach to risk management intended to 
ensure the defense establishment is sized, shaped, postured, committed, and managed to 
accomplish defense policy goals.  Managing risk means changes in operating practices 
and military and civilian personnel systems, business practices, and infrastructure.  These 
dimensions reflect DoD’s experiences over the last decade in attempting to balance 
strategy, force structure, and resources.  The risk management framework gives DoD the 
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ability to consider capability tradeoffs among fundamental objectives and fundamental 
resources constraints. 
The framework is made of four related dimensions: force management, operational, 
future challenges, and institutional.  Force management is the ability to recruit, retain, 
train, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the 
force while accomplishing operational tasks.  Operational is the ability to achieve 
military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency, with risk management 
considering not just additional force structure, but also assessing changes in capabilities, 
concepts of operations, and organizational designs to help reduce risk.  A future 
challenge is the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts 
needed to dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges.  The last dimension is 
institutional, the ability to develop management practices and controls that use resources 
efficiently and promote the effective operation of the defense establishment. 
Periodic assessment of existing and planned capabilities is part of ongoing risk 
assessment.  The TCP notes some nations that are practicing CBP will assess capabilities 
three or four times over an approximate fifteen year period.  For example, the Canada 
Department of National Defence uses a capability goals matrix to rank capabilities.  
There are four levels in the Canadian matrix—military strategic, operational, and tactical, 
with the operational level divided to identify goals in the domestic and international 
context.  The capability areas are rated as to importance (high, medium, and low) to the 
Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to achieve their overarching 
defense mission.  To reach high capability, the Department of National Defence and the 
Canadian Forces must be capable of exerting effective, unilateral defense ability in the 
majority of the applicable Canadian Joint Task List sub-tasks associated with that 
capability area.  The capability must be high and unilateral because it cannot be delegated 
to another nation or because experience and strategic circumstances dictate that high is 
the minimum acceptable level for overall success and risk management. 
Medium level capability goals, less easily defined, are those where an effective 
capability in most of the applicable sub-tasks is considered important and may also result 
from a conscious decision to assume some risk in that capability area.  For example, the 
Canadian Forces need to conduct joint and combined operations effectively and possess 
interoperability with major allies.  Canada’s risk assessment considers joint and 
combined operations as separate concepts.  “Jointness” is the art of combining 
capabilities from different military services to create an effect that is greater than the sum 
of the parts.  However, not all military functions or capabilities need to be joint: some 
will be combined. Canadian units more frequently will be combined (interoperate) with 
the units of another nation of similar capabilities, producing a larger formation and 
complementary capabilities coordinated in a specific situation.  Units may also need to 
assume a significant leadership role for medium capability goals, although this will not 
normally be necessary. 
A low capability goal indicates a minimum level of capability, depending on a 
specific strategic situation or an assessment of benefits in seeking a higher capability 
level for an assigned defense mission compared to costs.  Under a low capability goal, 
Canadian units must be able to take part in joint or combined operations, but not assume 
a leadership role. 
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In sum, the defense community experience points out that risk assessment is part of 
the CBP management process.  Risk assessment addresses affordability and 
sustainability, and thus risk tolerances and priorities for capability development and 
deployment and their impacts over time.  Assessment of risk is built into scenarios, 
capabilities review, and a consideration of benefits and costs.  Measurement systems are 
viewed as very important.  Other than scenario development and directions for states and 
localities to consider what is appropriate for their jurisdictions, risk assessment is not 
well-defined and presented as an integral part of homeland security CBP decision-
making.  Measures and evaluation systems are still in development.  Moreover, it will be 
difficult to develop and implement regional approaches where core capabilities can be 
supported and supplemented by other jurisdictions in the region.  Political considerations 
may encourage jurisdictions to have a complete set of core preparedness activities rather 
than rely on other entities.  As a result, many jurisdictions will be engaged in parallel 
activities within their own risk decisions, and there may be little opportunity to learn 
from one another or share resources as part of an overarching risk management approach. 
Different Planning Horizons 
An additional component is incorporating different planning horizons into CBP to stage 
the development of capabilities.  The timeframes should cover a sufficient span for action 
and changes to take effect, and then allow an assessment of risk over time.  To illustrate, 
the Canada Department of National Defence envisions three planning horizons, each with 
a different focus for CBP.  Horizon One is for a maximum of five years and seeks to 
deliver capability in already identified ways.  Horizon Two is for five to fifteen years and 
focuses on delivering already identified capabilities in better ways.  Horizon Three is for 
ten to thirty years and determines if capabilities are needed in the anticipated future, in 
addition to exploring radically new ways of delivering capabilities.  The time period is 
deliberately overlapping for Horizons Two and Three. 
Canada describes the first horizon as the most detailed because it executes an already 
developed plan and shapes near term program aspects.  It requires detailed programming 
of resources, determining if plans are unfolding as required, and developing the 
appropriate level of capability.  The second horizon optimizes how best to do what 
already is generally understood and ensure that introducing a more effective way of 
delivering a known capability transitions seamlessly into the more detailed plans from 
Horizon One.  The third horizon is the most challenging as it deals with introducing 
fundamental changes in the way a capability will be delivered and determining what 
developments promise to deliver the future necessary capabilities. 
Similarly, DoD describes the need for a two-pronged view of implementing CBP—
maintaining a military advantage in key areas while developing new areas of military 
advantage and denying asymmetric advantages to adversaries.  Thus, it entails adapting 
existing military capabilities to new circumstances, while experimenting with the 
development of new military capabilities.  More specifically, force development planning 
solves future capabilities by asking what top-down investment guidance is needed to 
address future strategic challenges.  Force development decisions also consider what 
DoD can provide in achievable technologies and methods of the future force.  In contrast, 
force employment decisions involve planning for today’s events, such as strategic 
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decisions as to how best to manage and posture DoD assets to support national interests 
and mitigate risks. 
In sum, the defense community incorporates different planning horizons into CBP to 
stage the development of capabilities for the near, medium, and long term.  The 
homeland security approach at this stage does not appear to have any similar expression 
of planning horizons.  The fifteen homeland security planning scenarios address an event 
in the “here and now” (bombings and bioterrorism) with an emphasis on national 
priorities.  DHS has promised to constantly assess and change CBP and thus the needed 
planning horizons may yet be addressed.  However, lack of attention to capabilities for 
varying horizons may result in implementing capabilities that may be appropriate next 
year, but not five years from now.  The result is poor investment portfolio planning and 
creating capabilities that may be obsolete or require extensive updating in a short time 
period.  The focus on national priorities may obscure or delay an emphasis on more 
valued planning horizons that anticipate possible future scenarios. 
Mission-Based, Phased Scenarios 
The eighth component is having the right scenarios on which to base planning and/or 
exercises.  Defense capability should be assessed using plausible situations encapsulated 
in planning scenarios.  These scenarios provide the context of CBP and should cover the 
full spectrum of military activities.  The scenarios help develop realistic capability goals 
and the provision of a defense force meeting government requirements at a minimum 
cost.  In addition, as mentioned earlier, scenarios should provide a series of time frames 
to facilitate capability assessment through time as part of risk assessment, rather than at a 
single arbitrary point in the future.  Scenarios also should be used in combination to 
assess simultaneous operations. 
Scenario types can be on a spectrum, ranging from real world planning scenarios to 
generic scenarios.  Whichever type of scenarios are used, the scenarios should reflect the 
type of tasks that the government may want its defense force to undertake.  In addition, 
scenarios used for CBP should be common across the defense force and detailed enough 
so that re-interpretation of the scenario does not occur. 
Australia uses one or more strategic scenarios to identify a capability requirement and 
then operational scenarios determine the operational requirements for a proposed 
capability.  Strategic scenarios represent strategically endorsed scenarios, high-level 
descriptions of situations with a brief history of preceding events and their context.  Each 
scenario typically will describe a conflict situation, an opposing force, a military setting, 
a theatre of operations and the events leading up to the conflict situation.  They specify 
the international setting and the attitudes of allies, allies of the enemy and neutrals.  They 
also detail the political aims of the Australian government and its military strategic 
objectives.  All strategic scenarios, taken together, in principle largely define overall 
defense requirements. 
Australia’s strategically derived operational scenarios are reference scenarios that 
have been extended from strategic scenarios, to provide sufficient detail for rigorous 
evaluation and descriptions of defense requirements for and use of capabilities.  One 
scenario example is evicting an enemy from an overseas territory with phases 
representing the buildup, the establishment of sea and air dominance, lodgement, the 
tactical battle, and the post-battle phase.  The Australian operational scenarios are more 
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detailed extensions of the strategic scenarios, often detailing a force structure with 
equipped capabilities to be applied to achieve the particular mission.  Strategic and 
operational scenarios form a link between strategic planning, futures analysis, 
experimentation, capability development, force development, contingency planning and 
preparedness. 
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence builds in what it calls “concurrency” in its 
use of scenarios for force structure development.  The Ministry of Defense establishes 
what is needed for a particular operational scenario and then maps the conclusions 
against a number of operations that should be conducted at any one time.  For example, 
the United Kingdom should be able to respond to a medium scale operation at the same 
time as an enduring small scale operation and a one time small scale intervention 
operation. 
The Canada Department of National Defence uses operational research tools in a 
scenario operational capability risk assessment model to identify how often different 
types of capabilities are called upon in the scenarios.  While there are arguments for using 
a broad range of scenarios in CBP to thoroughly test force structure for a wide range of 
situations, the Department of National Defence argues for a small number.  The 
Department believes that while a more comprehensive list of scenarios may theoretically 
add more precision to the force planning process, they may not as there are so many 
uncertainties. 
Thus, the defense community emphasizes that defense capability should be assessed 
by using plausible situations in planning scenarios to cover the full spectrum of military 
activities.  In addition, scenarios used for CBP should be common across the defense 
force and detailed enough so that re-interpretation of the scenario does not occur.  Many 
state and local officials are concerned that the national planning scenarios focus too much 
on terrorism and, as mentioned above, the scenarios do not include different timeframes, 
including very long term. 
The homeland security CBP approach makes the assumption that preparing for 
terrorist events, representing the vast majority of the planning scenarios, will prepare 
jurisdictions for all-hazards events.  Many would argue that it might make more sense to 
develop capabilities for more probable all-hazards that can be “ramped up” for large-
scale terrorist events or large-scale natural or non-intentional human-caused disasters.  As 
a result, capabilities would cover a full spectrum of homeland security activities.  
Capabilities then could be scaled to what is affordable and sustainable (and more likely to 
be used) at the state and local level, and then supplemented by regional and/or federal 
capabilities if an event overwhelms those capabilities.  This approach anticipates that in 
most catastrophic situations, even a full complement of capabilities at the local or 
regional level will be quickly overcome. 
Capability Development and Standard Categories 
A ninth component is providing guidelines to craft capabilities and develop standard 
capability categories that fully reflect what effects the capabilities should generate.  For 
example, the DoD’s Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board provides 
guidelines to craft capability descriptions.  The descriptions must indicate 1) what the 
capability is to do, such as “track” or “determine,” 2) identify a target or subject, such as 
a person on a battlefield, 3) the size or range of the subject, such as a large vessel, 4) the 
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domain of the target systems, such as air-breathing targets, 5) the area of action, and 6) 
the range to area, or the distance over which effects must be made or action taken.  
Capabilities are seen as the end of a “waterfall” of lower levels of mission used in 
functional area analysis, illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Battlespace Awareness Waterfall Example 
 
Regarding categories, the TCP recommends standard groupings such as capability 
clusters or capability partitions to make the CBP process more manageable.  There are 
many ways to define the boundaries between capability partitions.  These partitions are 
based on the ability to perform tasks, or to deliver effects, such as the control and denial 
of underwater battle space.  A key enabler for successful CBP is getting the partitions 
agreed to by the key stakeholders and account for synergies and dependencies across 
partitions.  The capability partitions should not be aligned to inappropriate organizations.  
If they are aligned, then organizational stovepiping is encouraged.5 
It is suggested at least two fundamental military capability categorization options can 
be used independently or in combination.  One is functional or means-focused.  These 
capabilities would include battlespace awareness, command and control, logistics, and 
force management.  Another option is operational or ends-focused.  Operational 
categories might include strategic deterrence, homeland defense, civil support, and land 
combat operations.  Each category then would be further defined. To illustrate, force 
management would include force employment and force deployment. Homeland defense 
would include capabilities such as continuity of operations, securing domestic approaches 
and territory, and population protection.6 
The defense communities have taken similar approaches to capability categorization.  
For example, as described by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, military tasks 
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provide a framework for detailed defense planning for the size, shape, and capabilities of 
the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces.  The military tasks reflect the broad types of tasks 
and operations in which the United Kingdom is likely to be involved and then provide an 
output-focused framework for developing force structure requirements.  The eighteen 
military tasks are in the four areas of 1) standing strategic commitments, such as nuclear 
deterrent and strategic intelligence gathering, 2) standing home commitments, such as 
security at home in support of other government departments, 3) standing overseas 
commitments, such as commitments to international alliances and partners, and 4) 
contingent operations overseas, such as humanitarian assistance and peace support 
operations.  Military capability is divided into six key capability elements, such as 
maritime, land, and logistics.  The Canada Department of National Defence divides 
military tasks into eight capability areas, such as Command, Information and Intelligence, 
and Corporate Policy and Strategy. 
The defense community experiences indicate that an important component is 
providing guidance on crafting capability descriptions and developing standard capability 
categories fully reflecting what effects the capabilities should generate.  DHS policies 
and guidance do generically define a capability, but guidance is lacking as to how to craft 
a capability description.  The homeland security capability categories should be agreed to 
by key stakeholders and account for interrelationships across the capability categories. 
At present, there does not appear to be a clear sense and rationale as to the best way 
to partition the homeland security capabilities for use by most entities.  The task list 
categories, still in draft, initially indicated capabilities will reflect primarily an indirect 
organizational categorization—federal, state, and local responsibilities, and then later on 
those for the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens.  This may have 
created organizational stovepiping of capabilities, which the defense community 
cautioned against.  The latest draft documents use “mission areas” for emphasis—
prevention, protection, response, and recover.  The IED prototype uses mission areas with 
critical tasks drawn from the organizational tasks lists, adding to the confusion of what 
categories are in play or may be the final form.  The categorization across task lists and 
capability areas should be clarified, justified, and stabilized. 
Decision Rules for Lists 
In another component, the defense communities establish clear rules for the development 
of task lists and capability lists.  These rules include the source for compiling the lists, 
what criteria will be used in selecting candidates for the list, and how they should be 
arrayed.  For example, the universal joint task list for DoD’s CBP is the result of fourteen 
years of spiral development.  Many sources of information from the task list to individual 
service sources to interagency information regarding tasks, conditions, and standards are 
being filtered for DoD’s universal capability library.  The library structure consists of a 
capability library—a master database of capabilities linked to current, planned, and 
roadmapped forces, units, and equipment—and a task library.  The task library is the 
master database of all doctrinal and conceptual tasks. 
The Australia Department of Defence has followed several principles for designing 
its Australian Joint Essential Tasks: joint, enduring, essential, and containing relevant and 
current content.  Joint tasks are those that require the contribution of two or more forces 
working together to achieve the desired outcome.  Enduring tasks capture how the 
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Australian Defence Force operates currently and might undertake joint operations in the 
future.  Essential tasks capture what are required for the conduct of an operation.   
In addition to the design principles, Australia Department of Defence has set two 
further design goals for future Joint Task development—uniqueness and hierarchical.  
For any given level of command, a task only appears once in the task hierarchy.  No tasks 
should be duplicated, although some related tasks might appear in more than one place.  
The requirement for uniqueness is analogous to the United States’ UJTL requirement that 
tasks be mutually exclusive, that is, that any task performed by any joint organization or 
service unit will fit into only one place in the task structure.  Thus common tasks were 
abstracted out of their natural parent task and were grouped together. 
In addition, the Joint Tasks, similar to other defense agencies, are intended to 
maintain a hierarchical structure.  For a high level task, its subordinate tasks, taken 
together, comprehensively define all of the activities in the higher-level task.  For 
example, the Australian Joint Tasks and Canada’s joint task list have three levels of joint 
tasks—strategic, operational, and tactical.  The tasks within each level are further 
disaggregated into two additional layers of sub-tasks with each layer more detailed and 
specific. 
However, opinions differ about hierarchical and uniqueness design for the lists.  
Some recommend that hierarchies should not be imposed because these require 
preconceived notions about what criteria are more valuable or useful for segregating data.  
Hierarchies require frequent changes or alternate versions of lists.  Mutual exclusivity 
also may not be required, at least at the operational level as no real force, unit, equipment, 
or system falls entirely within any one category. 
To summarize, the defense communities establish clear rules for the development of 
task lists and capability lists, such as uniqueness and hierarchy.  For homeland security, 
publicly available documents indicate a lack of explicit rules for decision-making.  As 
part of CBP implementation, DHS could easily formulate such rules.  Explicit decision 
rules should help the further development and revision of the detailed and lengthy lists 
over time.  For example, a rule regarding uniqueness would ensure developers would 
independently assess each task and whether its description is similar to or actually part of 
another task. 
CBP Evolution 
Another component is evolving CBP depending on planning applications and maturity.  
Each defense organization is in various stages of implementing CBP, both on a national 
joint and individual service level.  However, each organization has tailored CBP and 
taken a staged approach to implementation.  For example, as described by the Australia 
Department of Defence, allied CBP approaches are similar, but emphasize different 
outcomes over time: 
• The United Kingdom has primarily focused on immediate operations and long 
term planning.  The United Kingdom has used a list of essential joint tasks as an analysis 
tool for exercises with more recent efforts to integrate the tasks into mission analysis and 
operational planning. 
• Canada’s tasks are closely linked into force planning scenarios and future 
planning and are used in joint department structuring so each department uses the same 
criteria for operations and to translate tasks into capability.  Canada uses its joint task list 
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for force employment and capability development and has developed eleven force 
planning scenarios to link their capability development and planning. 
• The United States joint task list has aided in the development of planning 
requirements for joint exercises since 1993.  The joint task list was developed specifically 
for training but is now linked into readiness and preparedness reporting and capability 
development. 
CBP also will progress at a different pace in the organization, creating different levels 
of maturity overall.  Thus, some capabilities needed for the defense community of a 
nation may be delayed compared to others.  The Canada Department of National Defence 
points out that over time CBP improves commonality among defense planners by 
introducing a common way of describing and discussing capability elements.  As the 
different national defense organizations in Canada adopt the common terminology, it 
becomes easier to link different plans providing various capability components.  In the 
beginning, certain plans will be more mature or more vital for integrated planning.  
Canada’s long-term plan for major equipment is the most mature in employing CBP.  The 
development of long-term plans for personnel resources, research, concepts, information 
technology, and infrastructure is likely necessary before more encompassing capability 
planning can be done in Canada. 
Thus, the defense community experience includes evolving CBP to reflect planning 
applications.  CBP will progress at a different pace in different parts of the organization, 
creating different levels of maturity.  For homeland security, current policy timeframes 
have precluded a more evolutionary approach to CBP and imposed extremely limited 
turnaround time for stakeholder comments on various draft products.  DHS does plan on 
enhancing the approach, but it will be very hard to dismantle earlier structures once the 
homeland security grant process “institutionalizes” around capability categories and 
tiered requirements.  A comprehensive CBP system is expected to be up and running in a 
timeframe of months.  While adoption initially will be based on one scenario—explosive 
devices—for initial planning, federal funding guidance indicates that in less than two 
years, all scenarios will be part of state and local planning.  In addition, the CBP as 
currently being adopted does not directly address differing maturity in capability areas 
that may impede overall progress in homeland security preparedness.  DHS would be 
well-served to consider such maturity considerations in its CBP implementation 
decisions. 
CBP Enablers 
The last component is additional organizational and cultural enablers for effective CBP 
adoption.  These are other necessary and sufficient factors, which along with components 
already mentioned, such as stakeholder ownership, create and sustain the environment for 
implementation.  Many practitioners and students of CBP have highlighted 
considerations for CBP design and deployment that cover a wide range of factors, from 
mindset changes to the practicalities of resourcing CBP planning and execution. 
Davis and Jenkins write that CBP’s complexity requires a passion for adaptiveness 
and substantial analysis leading to a combination of incentives, standards, and policies for 
CBP.7  They cite the need for major studies on how to modify economic and other 
incentives to encourage more adaptive and recoverable systems.  Feaga recommends 
developing new languages in risk management and effects once it is known what 
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capability proficiency and sufficiency levels are needed.8  The Australian experience 
indicates attention is needed to address conflicting processes, the lack of suitable 
analytical tools, excessively prescriptive requirements, and the recognition of functional 
linkages and dependencies between related capabilities. 
Similarly, DoD recommends a broad and long-term strategic perspective, a greater 
appreciation of the operational and strategic environmental factors, and a rigorous 
analysis of the capabilities needed to achieve defense policy goals.  The Technical 
Cooperation Program lists the need for consistent cost estimates and resource provision 
for both the development and execution of the CBP process.  Moreover, joint force 
personnel will require a joint and expeditionary “mindset” reflecting a greater level of 
deployability and versatility to avoid organizational stovepiping.  Canada’s Department 
of National Defence identifies the challenge of developing and maintaining capabilities to 
conduct operations independently in domestic situations and alongside alliance and 
coalition partners for international obligations.  Canada believes the focus must remain 
on combat-capable units because these units can be employed in other security activities, 
such as peacekeeping, while those with non-combat capabilities cannot meet combat 
needs. 
Therefore, additional organizational and cultural enablers are needed for effective 
CBP adoption.  The defense experience indicates many facilitative factors come into play 
for effective CBP, many analytical and skill-based, but others such as incentives, the 
rationality of processes, and a deliberative approach.  For homeland security, enablers 
such as these may be recognized but have not been adequately addressed, perhaps 
because they are the difficult “softer” issues or the assumption is that they will be dealt 
with by stakeholders individually.  In addition, the rapid spiral development process has 
forestalled more careful consideration of CBP and what is needed to support its 
successful implementation. 
CHALLENGES IN ADOPTING THE DOD APPROACH 
While this article has highlighted many components important to CBP implementation if 
the DoD experience is the model, DHS will face further challenges in implementing 
CBP.  My analysis indicates that four key factors differentiate homeland security and the 
national defense mission that will pose challenges for DHS adoption. 
Mission Scope and Coverage 
A first challenge is mission related.  In defense, the mission scope is more clearly 
defined for national defense, most often military action and civil support.  While many 
rightly argue that the national defense mission has broadened considerably in recent 
years, for homeland security, the mission is arguably broader for prevention, vulnerability 
reduction, and response and recovery responsibilities.  Actions are required at home and 
abroad, from dealings with individual citizens to negotiations with nation-states as border 
protection is extended overseas.  Homeland security also stresses all-hazards 
preparedness, requiring attention to a wide range of events, from small-scale earthquakes 
to catastrophic terrorist events.  CBP should allow Homeland Security to consider these 
multiple and diverse missions, the common and unique capabilities they require, and 
what tradeoffs in priorities and resourcing might be necessary. 
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In addition, the defense experiences emphasize full mission coverage.  At present, it 
is not clear if the homeland security CBP approach is emphasizing prevention and 
deterrence.  While draft DHS task lists have included prevention efforts such as 
intelligence development and providing strategic and threat intelligence, the task lists 
focus much more attention on vulnerability reduction and response and recovery.  
Emergency response—after an event—appears to take the lion’s share of analysis and 
preparation with clear emphasis on first responder roles and responsibilities. 
The constrained homeland security mission scope and coverage may be the result of 
several factors.  Gilman observed that there has been a major DHS focus on weapons of 
mass destruction and terrorism, and not on all hazards and events that happen all that 
time, such as explosions.9  Prevention has been “under the radar screen” for DHS as it 
might be considered the purview of other agencies, such as the Department of Justice or 
the Central Intelligence Agency, or state and local law enforcement officials.  In addition, 
DHS’ Office for Domestic Preparedness has had a mission of emergency management, 
not other aspects of homeland security, and it would be normal to see this office 
maximize its area of strength or understanding.  Perhaps more importantly, since 
September 11, first responders have been front and center, their needs expounded, and the 
results in terms of new equipment and capabilities much more visible. 
Organizational Perspectives 
A second challenge involves organizational perspectives.  One perspective is a federal 
department versus a national view.  The defense community normally contains 
decisions within a cabinet department and White House sphere, with input from other 
federal agencies and to a lesser extent, international partners.  In contrast, homeland 
security is presented as national in scope, not a federal responsibility of primarily just one 
executive department or agency.  A national perspective requires a much more 
collaborative approach, particularly in a federalist system, and a fairly clear distinction 
between public and private spheres. 
Moreover, even within the federal homeland security establishment there is 
fragmentation.  Federal agencies other than DHS can act autonomously, buoyed by their 
own sources of support and direction.  Even when collaborative decisions are made, the 
vehicles for enforcement are very limited or unwanted.  The homeland security 
organizations represent different disciplines and perspectives, levels of public, private, 
and nongovernmental organizations, and even horizontal relationships such as the 
involvement of different federal, state, or local cabinet agencies.  Defense has a central 
core of military services that perform its activities that share a common culture and 
perspective to support and deploy the warfighter.  CBP should allow Homeland Security 
to change its unit of analysis from organizations and requirements to capabilities and 
their delivery. 
In addition, chain of command and exercise of authority are different.  Defense 
normally has a top-down command and control structure with a highly disciplined 
attention to authority.  The homeland security CBP approach at present does not 
adequately guide analysis when assets and capabilities to accomplish a mission are not 
under one jurisdiction, may be unknown, or may ebb and flow over time.  The draft 
national preparedness rating scheme indicates that a group of organizations can be rated 
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collaboratively under a mutual aide or an assistance compact to perform prevention, 
response, or recovery tasks for a specific scenario. 
For CBP, it is crucial that relationships are driven by strategic alliances among equal 
partners where all stakeholders—strategic partners—are identified, their needs clearly 
represented in collaborative decision-making, and incentives provided for decisions not 
to unravel.  Capability planning is always tied to sustainability analyses and funding 
support favors multiple-use capabilities and multiple sources of capabilities to reduce the 
funding burden on any one organization.  Additional work is needed to better understand 
how to apply the framework where there are networks of organizations that work 
homeland security issues or are discrete sets of organizations that handle specific 
homeland security functions.  Contingency planning is necessary in the event individual 
organizations or sectors will not meet their capability obligations.  This will be even more 
important when the CBP framework is expanded to address private sector and 
nongovernmental organizations who are critical players in prevention, vulnerability 
reduction, and response and recovery strategies and actions. 
Resource Development and Leveraging 
A third challenge is the resources that can be brought to bear for homeland security in 
contrast to the defense community.  To start, resource leveraging requires the 
understanding of assets that compose capabilities and in general what they can 
accomplish.  Capabilities include a diverse selection of elements, such as plans, 
procedures, personnel, equipment, and activities.  Defense organizations have paid 
considerable attention to the assets that can be combined for capabilities, where they are 
deployed, what their maintenance or skill condition is, and when they will become 
obsolete or require renewal.  This is not yet the case in homeland security, where asset 
identification and control is dispersed to thousands of organizations who may or may not 
have a complete and accurate inventory.  Many homeland security contingency plans 
draw on mutual aid or regional agreements, often without full identification of assets and 
how they will work together.  CBP provides a mechanism for asset identification, but 
initially CBP will be hampered as Homeland Security officials gather and assess this 
information and their contribution to capability planning. 
In addition, resources include planning resources, skills, tools, and experiences.  
Defense communities normally have decades, if not centuries, of planning experience for 
concrete events and contingencies.  These communities bring to bear a wide range of 
tools such as wargaming, exercises, and simulations, and a small army of skilled and 
experienced planners devoted to such work.  Exercises and actual field experience are 
rapidly fed back to planners.  In contrast, homeland security is in the early stages of 
planning and is often not well-resourced with dedicated staff, particularly in smaller 
jurisdictions.  Tools and skills are still in development in government organizations.  
While emergency exercises have been the norm for a number of years, a systematic 
collection, evaluation, and dissemination of lessons learned and better practices has only 
recently picked up speed.  The private sector in some critical infrastructure areas and for 
some companies, may have the requisite resources, skills, tools, and experiences, or can 
draw on combined sector practices, but not all.  Non-governmental organizations, with 
limited resources, may also have difficulty in adopting CBP.  It can be expected there 
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will be a slower identification of current and required capabilities and under what 
scenarios they are effective. 
A tiered CBP approach in homeland security may not adequately address the very 
wide variety of structures, skills, and processes for homeland security activities across the 
nation.  For example, Gilman noted that DHS does not understand, or chooses not to 
understand, that there is a major difference in homeland security or emergency 
preparedness operations and capacities between the rural and urban areas in a state or 
region.10  He said that many homeland security and emergency management contacts are 
in rural areas, and many are volunteers or handle homeland security along with many 
other tasks.  These officials often have limited infrastructure support, such as access to 
good communication services.  Rural areas also have more difficulty forming mutual aid 
compacts and, if they do, may get limited help because of geography or limited regional 
assets and liabilities.  Rural areas may have to wait many hours for mutual aid help to 
arrive because of the distances involved. 
Target Audience 
A final challenge is the differences in the target audiences for CBP.  For the defense 
community, the clear customer for CBP outputs is the combatant commander who must 
carry out the defense missions and relies on mission capability packages.  For homeland 
security, the target audience at present is broadly described by DHS as the “homeland 
security community,” which can cover federal, state, local, private, and nongovernmental 
organizations, and even to the level of the individual citizen.  Thus, there is not a discrete 
set of homeland security “combatant commanders” under the current DHS CBP 
approach.  This has added to the complexity and confusion surrounding CBP that will 
require further attention. 
Federal national policy is primarily directed at state and local jurisdictions at this 
time, with some attention paid to limited regional compacts.  It may be that CBP 
development over time will clarify that the combatant commander should be those state 
and local government officials responsible for direct prevention, vulnerability reduction, 
and response and recovery activities.  While private sector and non-governmental 
officials have direct homeland security responsibilities as well, the CBP process may 
need to stop at the governmental level.  Governmental CBP outputs can be planning 
inputs to these other jurisdictions for their own planning processes. 
Instead of supporting the combatant commander, the capabilities-based approach 
might get bogged-down in a checklist mentality of responding to lists of many tasks 
represented by the UTL (Universal Task List) and a targeted list for critical capabilities.  
“Checking off” the tasks forces attention to discrete activities, and not to capabilities and 
homeland security results for an organization and its homeland security partners.  State 
and local officials at the October 2004 capabilities workshop noted that the task lists and 
defined capabilities can easily become a standard of care to which they will become 
individually accountable.  A defensive posture might be to manage to the lists, and not to 
the overall results that must be achieved within a risk assessment decision-making 
process.  As a result, developing envelopes of capability for specific operational 
challenges for the combatant commander will be lost. 
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